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Abstract
This Article explores the costs and benefits of one subset of continuous and
discontinuous rules. These expressions are shown to be distinct from the familiar
dichotomy expressed as standards versus rules, but they share the difficulty of
dividing the world of law in two. Still, regulatory approaches that focus on
discontinuities can often be made more continuous, and vice versa. A speed limit
is discontinuous in the sense that one drives above or below (or within) the
announced limit. But it is often made more continuous – even with more
discontinuities – as when the stated limit is different for various kinds of vehicles.
This Article works around these definitional problems to show that law often
discourages useful disclosures by encouraging parties with information to offer
continuous information in order to avoid after-the-fact lawsuits when specific
disclosures prove to have inaccuracies. For example, it is common to hear or be
warned that a medical procedure poses the risk of death, when the better-informed
doctor or hospital could have given the precise percentages attached to various
outcomes. Similarly, a corporation is on safe ground when it follows “generally
accepted accounting principles,” when investors would have learned more from
information about good and bad outcomes put in probabilistic terms. The Article
works toward the suggestion that law might create a safe harbor in which
probabilistic disclosures are protected when they are, or are certified to be, more
useful than the ready alternative of fairly general disclosures.

INTRODUCTION
There are obvious costs and benefits to discontinuous, and often more precise, rules. A driving age
of seventeen, or an announcement that a meeting will begin at 9:00 A.M., provides more
information than an approximation, often continuous in character, like: “One can drive when
mature, and then more hours per day are permitted as one gains experience.” A parent or employer
might sensibly apply the latter rule within a small group, but it is unlikely to work well for in a
sizeable legal system. Continuous rules are not synonymous with standards; an employer is unlikely
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to say: “The meeting will begin in the morning when enough people are present.” The statement
conveys a standard but is not continuous – a difference discussed in Part II. The employer’s
announcement is vague, but more precise announcements may also provide little information and
benefit. Consider a typical warning, often required by law, or at least used as a way of insulating a
person or entity against the threat of tort liability: “This medical procedure may cause stiffness,
paralysis, or death.” The patient is duly warned, but would receive much more information if the
disclosure gave the probability of each of these results. The patient could be presented with a curve
reporting the distribution of expected outcomes. There will be resistance to a rule requiring this
kind of disclosure, not only because it introduces more opportunity for error, but also because as
soon as specific information is revealed, it is obvious that it could be yet more specific. Thus, the
impact of the medical procedure is likely to vary somewhat depending on a patient’s age, gender
and other characteristics. As a matter of tort law, it is easier to comply, and be protected, by offering
the more discontinuous information – for then the patient was duly warned – than by offering more
data, perhaps in the form of a sliding scale with known probabilities of various outcomes.1 The
latter provides much more information, but is also much easier to challenge after the fact. A patient
who suffers from a serious outcome might either point to one false piece of information in the
presented graph – and with a hundred pieces of embedded information, it is far more likely that a
lawyer will find an inaccuracy2 – or might argue that the continuous information offered was
misleading. After all, the doctor probably knew that the patient’s age or prior medical history made
the graph misleading, as it represented the experience of many prior patients, most of whom had
different medical histories. Unsurprisingly, the disclosure required or encouraged by law is of little
help, and yet it is an easier rule for law to enforce, and it is a rule favored by doctors and hospitals
because it makes for easier compliance. Even some patients might think it superior because it is
easier to read, however useless it might be and however inclined most patients, like other
consumers, are to skim or ignore it before signaling their consent. This argument about the value
of probabilistic disclosures, and the fact that they are presently discouraged by law, is the
centerpiece of this Article.

Arguably, a warning: “This could cause death,” or even a typical highway speed limit, is continuous. “Could
cause” is not precise and is, therefore, by nature continuous; it simply does not convey the likelihood of a bad
outcome. Similarly, even a stated speed limit, though a rule rather than a standard, allows the driver to proceed
at less than the stated limit. On the other hand, disclosing the three dangers of a drug is in an important way
more discontinuous than a warning that “This drug can cause drowsiness or death.” Most rules, though fairly
precise, are arguably continuous in this way. A truly discontinuous rule would be “You must drive at exactly
60 or 80 kilometers per hour and nothing lower, higher, or in between.”
2
The patient will not need to show much in the way of causation because of product liability law’s heeding
presumption.
1

Corporate law, in particular, is an area where probabilistic information – already available
to one party – ought to be made widely available. This information often has elements of continuity
and discontinuity, but it is at present withheld in large part because disclosure is accompanied by a
risk of liability when it is later discovered to have provided an inaccurate particle of information. It
is not simply that corporate and securities law make use of continuous as well as discontinuous
rules. For example, continuously defined controlling shareholders are subject to a strict fiduciary
obligation,3 while discontinuously defined acquirers must make the government and the world
aware of their holdings of more than 5% of the stock of a corporation.4 Many areas of law are
peppered with such contrasts. But corporate law, like the law governing products liability, medical
malpractice, and other areas where disclosure is law’s centerpiece, is also home to rules that
encourage vague information of limited value. It is fair to say that rules requiring disclosure
normally discourage yet better disclosure, because each disclosed fact not only creates an
opportunity for error but also raises the question of why exceptions and subsets were not disclosed.
Much as a surgeon is encouraged to disclose that there is “some chance” that an operation – indeed
virtually every invasive procedure – could lead to a disastrous result, corporations are increasingly
encouraged to say things like “a lawsuit that has been brought against us presents some risk that
our profits will decline.” In both cases, the better-informed insider could more usefully offer a series
of probabilities, but current law discourages such disclosures. This Article offers an improvement
to these governing laws.
Before expanding on such improvements, it is useful to have several tools, each of which
elucidates some aspect of continuity and discontinuity in law. Part I clears the deck a bit by showing
why the continuity/discontinuity distinction is not the same as the more familiar rules/standards
dichotomy so familiar to scholars and students of law. Part II digresses a bit to show that precision
in legal rules, usually derived from discontinuities, is often convertible to continuity. Similarly, but
less frequently, continuity can often be converted to discontinuity. The choice is therefore one about
a default rule, or starting point, rather than an impregnable choice for lawmakers. Part III turns to
the idea that the discontinuity (default) option is readily available where there are natural or familiar
demarcations. Conversion from continuity to discontinuity in these settings requires strategies that
lawmakers (and citizens) are often unwilling to take either because they are costly or politically
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4
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owner reports until their holdings drop below 5%. Similarly, acquirers of more than 10% of a share class are
subject to the Exchange Act‘s disclosure requirements for insiders, 17 CFR § 240.13d-1 (2018).

unattractive. Part IV then returns to the central contribution of this Article, and the one suggested
at the outset. Probabilistic information, often continuous in form, is normally better information,
but it is resisted by both lawmakers and regulated parties. Often law resorts to guidelines while
private parties develop and adhere to what are declared to be “best practices,” and these might be
understood as an acceptable but inferior substitute for more explicit continuous or discontinuous
rules. Either result, non-binding guidelines or useless warnings, is inferior to the apparent
alternative of structured information. The discussion proposes a safe harbor for information that is
more useful than that which normally, and often minimally, complies with the law. The most
obvious area to experiment with such an innovation is corporate law, where guidelines, accepted
accounting conventions, and uninformative demarcations are common.

I. RULES/STANDARDS AND DISCONTINUITIES/CONTINUITIES
All law students are taught to think about the choice between rules and standards. “Drive at a safe
speed, appropriate to the road conditions” is easily contrasted to “Speed limit: 100 km/hour; 85
km/hour for trucks.” The latter provides rules that are easy for the driver to interpret and easy for
law to enforce, even as they are unlikely to be optimal in other ways. The former statement, a
standard, recognizes that weather and road curvatures play roles in designating the efficient speed
for drivers. Nearly every instruction law gives to citizens, or principals give to their agents, can be
described as an attempt to select sensibly between rules and standards, or to combine the two. In
some cases, because they are more specific, rules can be described as discontinuous when compared
with standards. But when an instruction takes the form of a rule, it can be more or less continuous.
Thus, the second form of instruction above uses two rules (100 and 85 km), and takes a step towards
continuity. Had it announced fifty different speeds for various vehicle sizes and weather conditions,
it might best be described as a continuous set of rules, especially when arranged in ascending or
descending order. The same is true for a standard. It is fair to say that the continuous/discontinuous
spectrum is a subset of, and lies within, the rule/standard gamut.
Consider, for example, the fact that in many legal systems, once a jury finds a defendant
more likely than not to have been negligent and to have caused an innocent plaintiff’s loss, the
negligent defendant pays single damages so that the plaintiff is, at least in some sense, made whole.
It matters not whether the factfinder is 60% or 95% sure of defendant’s negligence. This is an
example of a discontinuity. Plaintiff either wins or loses, and this in turn is based on a more-likelythan-not finding of negligence (and then of causation). Similarly, virtually all legislatures pass or
reject bills, including amendments to them, by up or down majority votes, in what is known as the
motion-and-amendment process. Note that this discontinuity is a subset of a rule, as opposed to a

standard. The same is true if some matters require a supermajority vote. If the practice is: “An
amendment to a bill is rejected if the speaker of the legislative chamber sees substantial opposition
to it,” we would have a standard (discretion is now in the hands of the speaker, and need not be
consistent over time, as is the case for some faculty votes in my law school, where the Dean is
essentially the parliamentarian as well as the presiding official, and need not follow his own
precedents), but it is at the same time discontinuous, in the form of an up or down decision.
This Article pays limited attention to the particular discontinuity phenomenon just
illustrated, because it has been well discussed in earlier literature.5 The key insight there is that
binary decisions avoid, or at least hide, cycling preferences. If an odd number of voters must choose
between A or not-A, A either wins or loses, and life goes on. On the other hand, if the group must
choose among three or more proposals, it can easily cycle; it might prefer A>B, C>A, and yet B>C.
This will often lead to great displeasure, inasmuch as it will appear to have thwarted a majority;
when C wins in the second vote, those who favored B, eliminated in the first vote, will be puzzled
at C’s victory once they compare notes and realize that a majority preferred B over C. In these
cases, the order of voting, as well as other procedural rules, will matter and, in the end, a majority
of voters will inevitably be unhappy. If there is nothing more going on, I have argued elsewhere
that a discontinuity is preferred (A wins or loses, and proposals are voted on one at a time) in order
to avoid cycling, but where cycling is extremely likely, legislatures are suddenly not restricted to
up or down votes, but are instead offered a list of options until one is selected by a majority. Again,
because this subset of discontinuous choices in law is already recognized, the focus in this Article
is directed elsewhere – to the many cases where legal decisions could be discontinuous with three
or more options, or categories. There will be room, however, to consider binary decisions that are
not entrusted to juries or other decisionmakers that might generate cycling, and thus instability or
dissatisfaction.
As we will see, this Article goes well beyond the point about the way in which
discontinuities, and in particular binary options, hide the problem of cycling. But the point here is
simply that categories, demarcations, or what might be called “relative discontinuities,” not only
serve to divert attention away from the problem of majority rule where there are several options
and several “voters,” but also differentiate the discontinuity/continuity division from the rulestandard distinction. For example, in many jurisdictions a senator is elected by attracting a plurality
of voters, and then serves a specified term. The process can be described as a discontinuous election
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See Saul Levmore, Parliamentary Law, Majority Decisionmaking, and the Voting Paradox, 75 VA. L. REV.
971, 1012-23 (1989) [hereinafter Voting Paradox]; Saul Levmore, More Than Mere Majorities, 2000 UTAH
L. REV. 759, 772 (2000).

(one candidate wins the term of office), though it may suffer from cycling. With more than two
candidates, the second or third-place candidate may well be preferred by a majority of voters over
the plurality winner.7 A more continuous system would have given the winner a longer term of
office depending on the size of the victory. The example shows, one last time, that
discontinuity/continuity is not the same as the rule/standard distinction. The winning candidate’s
reward of a full term regardless of the margin of the electoral victory has little to do with rules and
standards, and everything to do with the choice of discontinuity over continuity. The election was
an all-or-nothing competition.

II. CONVERTIBILITY TO AND FROM LAW’S DEMARCATIONS
A. Converting from Categories to Continuity
There is no need to overstate law’s use of categories. In many cases, law-makers categorize with
limited impact. Citizens will find ways to make room between categories so as to smooth out
previous discontinuities. Consider first a simple case: Law says that a couple is either married or
not. The rule seems binary and can be defended as convenient. In the event of separation or death,
assets can be cleanly allocated; important medical decisions can be made by one and only one
person when the patient is incapacitated; and in some legal systems, monetary obligations can be
assigned to one person, unless responsibility is disavowed in a way that potential creditors can
discover. In other cases, legal rules as tertiary. One is either a dependent child, a single adult, or an
adult married to a single person. Most legal systems forbid polygamy, though its acceptance or
rejection is also a discontinuous rule. The critical point here is that people can often escape
categories. Couples can live together for as long as they like without any declaration of marriage
or fidelity, and over time most legal systems find themselves forced to recognize their arrangements
for some purposes. Unmarried couples, or indeed threesomes, can form business partnerships for
some purposes and not others; they can contract almost as they like for childcare and support
obligations. They can buy property together or separately. In short, they can turn an on-or-off
category into one with selective continuity.
This kind of convertibility is found in many areas of law, and indeed law itself helps people
cross categorical boundaries. Thus, law prefers clear ownership of real property, but people can
choose to rent property with a variety of obligations resting on the formal owner; they can use a
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If the vote was 40-32-28 for candidates ABC, and all the voters who most preferred B, like C more than A,
then a majority prefers the third-place candidate C, more than the plurality winner, A. C might also be a
Condorcet Winner, because once the A voters are taken into account, C might also be preferred over B, but
that disadvantage of plurality voting, and great advantage of motion-and-amendment voting, is not needed
for the discussion in the text.

corporate or trust form to purchase property with others. They can even occupy a property for a
period of time until law is virtually forced to recognize them as owners for some purposes.
Similarly, there is the convenient distinction and set of obligations attached to employer and
employee, and yet one can outsource tasks, can work for multiple employers, can hire temporary
workers, can form business partnerships instead of employment contracts, and can take other steps
that law itself enables. Finally, elected officials might call for double or treble damages for certain
kinds of violations, but judges and juries will know this, and they can adjust their calculation of
damages to create more continuous results.
For an example that is far from binary, consider the variety of categories assigned to those
who pool resources. Investors might begin by choosing the corporate or partnership form.
Alternatively, they can engage in some activities as non-profit entities. Over time, most legal
systems have been forced, through competition or a desire to serve their citizens, to add categories
such as limited liability corporations and various forms of partnerships to the point where
distinctions which were once discontinuous become close to smooth and unlimited in form.
Moreover, corporations can give money to non-profit organizations, and non-profit entities can
engage in (often taxable) unrelated businesses designed to produce profits. These moves permit the
original investors to smooth out the choices that law originally offered. It is safe to say that where
law offers categories, people (or politicians) can often find ways to put their activities in between
these categories, converting legal discontinuities to practical continuities. The original categories
may have reflected ethical intuitions about how society should be organized, or they may have
offered efficient default rules, but neither origin makes convertibility objectionable. One was once
a citizen or not, but over time dual citizenship developed, and then permanent residence, guest
work, and lotteries, until the system is better described as continuous than discontinuous, and all
the more so where there are treaties, conventions, and statutes covering temporary workers and
family reunification. The point is not that categories, or discontinuities, are meaningless, but rather
that over time legal systems decide on their malleability. One really is or is not an elected official;
there are benefits and costs to marriage and to citizenship; there is a point to naming a beneficiary
in a will. Categories can be important, even if at first blush they are overstated.
Convertibility of the kind just described is not limited to legal categories. A family might
identify with a single religious group, but over time family members move within sects and
eventually, through inter-marriage or personal choice, they combine sects, denominations, magical
inclinations, and even fundamental beliefs. Religious leaders might ostracize or otherwise insist on
clear and time-honored categories, but these rarely survive in their original forms. Similarly, people
might “belong” to political parties, but over time, even as the parties try to enlarge by making their

policies fuzzier, voters can alternate their affiliations and support multiple and opposing parties. In
the end, many categories survive by becoming so fluid as to be barely distinguishable from
competitors, or their members develop fluidity on their own. And yet other categories are less fluid.
A criminal trial might be nominally required to end with a verdict of innocence or guilt but, in
reality, judges and juries convert these categories to continuities by adjusting prison sentences or
other penalties. There is no shortage of examples of discontinuous rules that can be made
continuous. The ability to cross boundaries may make some impenetrable lines more meaningful.
Resigning from a tenured university position, like deserting from an army or signing divorce papers,
is serious precisely because the decisionmaker announces that he or she regards the category as
important.
As the examples offered here increase in number, it is easy to wonder whether there is any
solid meaning to “discontinuity.” The meaning itself seems continuous. It may be useful, therefore,
to think of both terms as relative to one another. For instance, law has reason to define the category
of employment. For purposes of tax law and workers compensation one is or is not an employee.
We have seen that a firm and a worker can smooth the line between employee and outsider, but in
the end when we observe various contracts and other arrangements, it is easy to say which of two
persons who do work that is used by Google is more likely to be regarded as an employee of that
company. In any event, the slope is no more slippery than that between rules and standards – a
distinction with a venerable history in the thinking about law.
B. Converting from Smooth Rules to Categories
Conversion occurs in the other direction as well, though perhaps not with the same regularity. The
most significant causes of conversion are a taste for certainty, control over agents, and a desire to
limit information available to others. In common law systems, judges were equipped with the power
to say that a claim should have been brought earlier in time in order to produce fresher evidence or
avoid strategic delay by a claimant,8 but over time legislatures introduced specificity by enacting
statutes of limitation. In this case, it should be noted, continuity/discontinuity matches the
standards/rules distinction. Conversion to continuity is quite common, and may be associated with
modernity and complexity. It may also be that as law expands, it is easier to find conversions,
though this hardly means that there is more conversion toward continuity than away from it. Thus,
modernity has brought with it more licensing requirements. Licensing exams of all kinds, including
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state bar exams in the U.S., may not announce a passing grade, but over time applicants learn that
if they get X% of the questions right, or finish in the top Y% of test-takers, they will pass. A similar
reality is found with respect to drivers who exceed posted speed limits, but discover that
enforcement begins at some point beyond the stated limit. Restaurants are required to be open for
inspection to ensure safe preparation of food, but in practice both the inspectors and restauranteurs
know that one violation of a code requirement will normally lead to a warning and an instruction
to improve, while three or more violations will prompt immediate shutdown. Both sides adjust
accordingly. Contract law offers sliding-scale damages in the event of a breach, but parties can
contract in advance for discontinuity by agreeing to specified damages (within reason) in the event
of a failure to perform. These are all examples of law’s expansion through discontinuous rules, that
then take on continuous qualities.
Some of these examples reflect a desire to avoid transaction costs, and this causes
conversions both in and out of law. A judge might be empowered to impose sentences ranging from
one to ten years for a given crime, but the judge might be found to impose sentences of one, three,
or ten years, with rarely anything in between. The same is true for the assignment of fines and the
suspension of licenses. This sort of inclination is much like diners in a restaurant who are free to
tip the waiter any amount or any percentage of the check, where tipping is conventional, but are
found to leave 5%, 15%, or 20% with rare exception. It is interesting that where tipping is
unconventional, practices are more continuous, as diners leave nothing, a small percentage, or the
amount of loose change they happen to carry.
Finally, it is tempting to think of income taxes as more discontinuous than required, or
optimal. There could be one hundred rates, rising with income or wealth, but in practice there is
often a truly flat tax, a proportional tax, or just a small number of categories with increasing rates.
The example reflects the problem of defining continuity.9 It is arguable that a proportional tax (of
say 20% of income, applied to all taxpayers) is continuous because the income it taxes and the
extracted amounts are continuous, though the rate itself is discontinuous. There is little to gain from
this distinction, so I proceed to some discussion of demarcations in Part III, by limiting the
discussion to cases where relative continuity is fairly clear. As we will see, once the notion of
discontinuity is thought of in relative terms, it becomes apparent that parties may respond to legal
rules in relatively discontinuous terms, when continuity might be more useful.

Continuity is relative. “Stay as long as you like,” is an offer in continuous form. “Stay until 11 or until 3,
as there are trains at those two times,” is more discontinuous. It is easy to state instructions that lie in between.
The argument here does not depend on a precise definition.
9

III. DISCONTINUITY AND DEMARCATIONS
Discontinuity is often attractive where there are natural boundaries. For example, lawmakers might
legislate a non-discrimination rule in employment, or a requirement of racial or gender diversity,
but such rules require a clear understanding of protected groups (categories) as well as some
measurement of discrimination or diversity. Often the goal is a kind of continuity, but the
definitional problem is solved with widely accepted demarcations. Put differently, while the
discussion in Part II emphasized how easy it might be to break through boundaries or convert
discontinuities, in reality the definitional problem is overcome by conventions or by widely
accepted categories to which law adheres, or that law helped create in the first place. For example
drawn from corporate law, a legal system might declare that at least one-third of the directors of a
corporation must be women, or it might approve a settlement providing that a company accused of
discrimination must now hire six women for every four men hired in the next five years. Leaving
aside the question of defining the category (women) in a world with self-described nonbinary
persons – itself an example of converting law’s discontinuity into continuity – it is apparent that a
continuous goal is made enforceable with a discontinuous rule. Note that here too the discontinuity
can sometimes be converted. Many corporations can appoint or elect women who are also directors
in other corporations, so that there remain vastly more male than female directors in the corporate
world. More tellingly, the 6:4 rule can be controverted by outsourcing a great deal of work to entities
that are not incorporated or that are of a size unaffected by the legislation. The business world might
end up more male dominated than before the legislative intervention. The observation is hardly
limited to corporate boards. Employment law or anti-discrimination law might forbid mandatory
retirement contracts, but firms can avoid the law by outsourcing work to other jurisdictions with
different rules or, as is the case for law firms in the U.S., by doing business as partnerships that are
not subject to the law because partners are not “employees.” In these cases, law’s attempt to have
categories subject to certain treatments requires clear and well-drawn categories in the first place.
Clearer categories may make for ready enforcement, but they may also make it easier to comply
without accomplishing the legislative goal.
It must be apparent that I am not suggesting that discontinuity is exclusively produced by
available demarcations. For instance, democracies could elect officials who would then serve
longer terms in proportion to the size of their victories. This sort of practice would make every vote
count and might reflect intense preferences or relative confidence in finding the right answer, but
it is not deployed in any nation, law firm, university faculty, or shareholder vote as far as I know.
There are good reasons for this rejection. For example, the power of the Condorcet Jury Theorem,
or simply the wisdom of crowds, is lost if a marginal voter rather than a majority thinks the winner

should serve eight years rather than seven or five.10 But the point for now is that this is an example
where citizens are unable to convert a discontinuous rule to one that is continuous – even though
there is no reason to think that the former, usually set in a charter of some kind, is optimal. Other
examples are less striking, but they support the larger claim about convertibility. Thus, one must
vote for one candidate or another in a typical election; only academic law professors and social
scientists seem to favor systems where voters allocate points, and in this way are able to signal their
preferences over a continuous range. And yet, even this discontinuity can be modestly converted
by giving different amounts of money or personal effort to some candidates.

IV. ENCOURAGING USEFUL DISCLOSURES THROUGH SAFE HARBORS
A. Loose Instructions and Stronger Disclosures
We return now to the argument introduced in Part I – that unhelpful continuous or discontinuous
rules could and should yield to more useful ways of structuring information. This idea is not limited
to disclosure rules, but it is these that will be the subject of this Part, if only because the proposal
suggested later in this Article is more applicable to disclosures meant to inform consumers, patients,
and investors than it is to instructions.
Consider two examples of instructions and disclosures. As for instructions, imagine again
that law requires that women occupy at least one-third of the seats on the board of directors of a
publicly traded corporation. The directive provides more information than a pure standard that “the
board must have a reasonable number of women.” Compliance is easy. Shareholders and other
interested parties may not know whether a given board with nine directors will have three, four, or
more women, but precision is unlikely to matter to most observers. Even if the goal is expressive,
a clear statement (and its enforcement) is usually more valuable than a continuously formed
ambition.
In contrast, consider a disclosure by a corporation that its rate of return, in 2019, on all
foreign investments was greater than 6% and is expected to be greater than 6% in the coming two
years, depending on taxes, various lawsuits, government contracts, and so forth. Both disclosures
may be accurate and in compliance with various legal requirements, but they are of limited use to
investors, who care whether the seemingly precise first number is 6, 7, or 8 – and whether the firm’s
investments are riskier than before. As for the projection regarding the coming years, investors
would like to know that the corporation estimates 6% with a probability of 51%, 7% with a 10%
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The Condorcet winner might be preferred by only a bare majority, but strongly disliked by a large minority,
with intensity-based voting therefore bypassing the optimal result. See Levmore, Voting Paradox, supra note
6, at 995.

probability, 10% with a probability of 15%, and so forth. The corporation is likely to have these
probabilities, but full disclosure is unattractive, or even dangerous. One small error will open it up
to lawsuits. As is often the case, one might expect market pressures to overcome a disinclination to
provide what consumers (or shareholders) want, but here the threat of massive liability for small
errors can discourage disclosures that most shareholders value. It would be easy for law to remove
this incentive to withhold useful and available information. Law could encourage more useful, or
in this case probabilistic, disclosures without increasing the threat to corporations that they will be
found to have misled investors when they actually sought to provide better information. The patient
reader will soon find a suggestion about the kind of safe harbor that law might provide in order to
encourage more useful disclosures.
Probabilistic disclosure of the kind just described, or simply a requirement that someone
reveal available information about the likelihood of dangers, or of good and bad news, is not
something that law presently offers. In the case of corporate disclosures, it may be that risk adjusted
estimates are often not easily available to the firm itself. But even when such information is
available (as it surely is for most medical procedures) law discourages disclosure because any errors
that are later discovered will subject the firm to costly lawsuits. As if in anticipation of this Article,
and the argument that protecting more detailed and discontinuous disclosures would be desirable,
Senator Elizabeth Warren, in 2019, while attempting to be the Democratic candidate in the 2020
U.S. presidential elections, suggested that corporations should be required to disclose the fact that
climate change might have an adverse effect on their projected earnings.11 Admittedly, the idea was
not to inform shareholders about their investments, but to raise interest in climate change and to
encourage greater political support for laws aimed at this problem. If shareholders thought that
unmitigated climate change would affect their investments, they might be more inclined to pay
higher taxes or sacrifice short-term profits in order to enjoy a more secure future. Indeed, risk averse
citizens might be effectively frightened into action with continuous information, even when more
accurate information is available. Warren’s idea was consistent with many disclosure requirements,
as the suggested disclosures provided less information than they might have. A corporation is
required to disclose knowledge of factors that might have a significant impact on the value of the
firm.12 For example, firms regularly reveal the presence of lawsuits, and usually report (accurately,
11

Press Release, Office of Senator Elizabeth Warren, Senator Warren, Representative Casten Lead
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let us assume) that management does not expect the litigation it describes in its annual statements
to have a significant impact on projected profits. The disclosure is not unlike that found to avoid
products liability or to protect against claims brought against health-care providers for failing to
disclose risks. There are risks, but disclosures often do not contain much information; firms issue
vague warnings when they could disclose more useful information that they can easily obtain. For
instance, a firm has probably calculated the risk attached to each lawsuit it faces, in order to decide
how much to spend on defense or whether to settle a case on some terms. An optimist might say
that present disclosures inform motivated recipients to investigate further, but usually the point of
disclosure is, or ought to be, to lower the overall cost of information acquisition by placing the
burden on the better-informed party, and especially so if this is likely to avoid duplicative
information gathering by other, dispersed parties.
Warren’s proposal, it might be noted, aimed to serve a political goal. She did not
recommend that the government be required to disclose the probability that 10,000 undocumented
immigrants will commit at least a certain number of serious crimes, or that corporations disclose
the likelihood that higher tax rates will cause them to build new factories abroad rather than in the
United States. No corporation (or politician) has an incentive to disclose such information about
taxes and foreign investment. Not only will a single disclosure likely have minimal impact on
important decisions, but also there is considerable danger that if Warren were eventually elected,
the Securities and Exchange Commission would seek to penalize a company that disclosed friendly,
and inevitably incomplete, information about taxes and foreign investment as misleading. It is
dangerous to disclose a best projection about the future, unless it is in a form specifically required
by the government. Most disclosures are sensibly made as vague as possible in order to comply
with the law, while avoiding ex post judgments that they were misleading or knowingly incomplete.
In almost all cases, the greater the volume and specificity of information, the more likely it
is that later investigation will reveal that a false disclosure was made. If a corporation must disclose
its sales numbers in each of fifty locations, it is more likely that one or more of these disclosures
will be inaccurate, than if it discloses, as might be required,13 the single fact of overall sales, or even
the useless fact that “Sales cannot yet be reported with accuracy because of our generous return
policy, but we are pleased to report that sales are likely to be greater than they were last year. Of
course, this assessment is subject to the possibility of bad weather, new and competing products
from abroad, strikes by unions within and beyond our control, and economic developments that
might cause consumers to buy fewer of our products.” Whether this not-so-fanciful disclosure is
13

The instructions in § 229.301 of the Code of Federal Regulations require, for example, reporting of net
sales and operating revenues in the financial data provided by a registered entity.

regarded as reflecting a continuous or discontinuous legal rule, it provides almost no useful
information to shareholders. It is attractive to the corporation because it is very difficult for a
shareholder (or the government) to claim later that facts were misleading or knowingly falsified.
Investors might appreciate a report that specified the probability of various results, as known to a
well-run corporation, but the more numerous or detailed such disclosures, the greater the chance
that at least one item is incorrect or even intentionally falsified by a disgruntled employee. The
irony is that in an age where big data allow better predictions and reports, corporations often reveal
less useful data. These useless revelations, whether in a form that sounds continuous or
discontinuous, is worse than truly continuous revelations and also inferior to available information
that could satisfy a requirement of well-chosen but discontinuous information. Current disclosure
rules can be cynically described as “vaguely specific.” Put simply, it would be unusual to hear a
corporation or even a government official saying “we recommend action x because the probability
of danger y is between 15% and 40%.” The corporation or government is likely to have just such
information, and investors or citizens need the information in order to make cost-benefit
calculations.
The relevance of the discussion in Part II, about convertibility, is plain. Regulated parties
have good reason to convert a precise and discontinuous requirement into one that is more
continuous but less useful. And they have reason to convert continuous requirements – such as
“Disclose risks that may have a substantial impact on corporate profits” – into more discontinuous
revelations that comply with the law. And as for the discussion of familiar demarcations in Part III,
it is easy to see that the problem can be mitigated in the presence of such demarcations. For an
example outside of corporate law, consider that the law in some jurisdictions requires sellers to
state that “Products sold here include both kosher and non-kosher products,” if there is reason to
think that some customers will think that the name of the store or the presence of some kosher
products means that all products in the establishment are kosher.14 A regulated party can easily
comply without fear of litigation because of the presence of an external demarcation. In many
jurisdictions that have such laws, there are outside organizations that inspect ingredients and the
preparation of food, and then certify items as kosher. The certification may be under-inclusive (as
when the certifier refuses to attach the kosher label to a restaurant open on the Sabbath even though
the foodstuff is technically kosher), but this is of minor importance to a regulated party that simply
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Massachusetts, for example, requires that any person selling both kosher and non-kosher foods refrain from
posting “on his door or window or anywhere in front of his place of business [a sign] bearing the word
‘Kosher,’ ‘Kosher for Passover’ or ‘pareve’ in any language or any sign or mark… which might lead a
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stating “‘Non-Kosher Food Also Sold Here’ in block letters.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 156(3)(b) (2019).

wants to avoid losing a lawsuit or being fined by the givernment. It is noteworthy that for most of
these interested consumers, discontinuous information is what they seek; a product is either certified
as kosher or it is not. If there is a higher level of kashruth, a different and perhaps more demanding
outside organization is called upon to provide certification. In slight contrast, if medical research,
or the government itself, holds that a product is safe if it contains less than x amount of a carcinogen,
then the disclosing party can comply and provide all the information that a later court will need.
This is so even though some consumers would benefit from more precise information because they
are particularly sensitive or fearful, or because they are exposed to multiple products offering the
same semi-continuous disclosure. Note that the producer is able to comply with the law by
providing, or converting to, fairly continuous information, while the consumer is unable to convert
to greater discontinuity.
Returning to corporate law, there are, roughly speaking, two kinds of information released
about corporations that might not be out to maximize share prices or otherwise conform to the norm
of shareholder primacy. First, there is self-certification. Many states now offer the corporation an
opportunity to warn investors that it has a goal other than profit or share-price maximization. A
corporation can self-certify, in discontinuous fashion, that it is a public benefits corporation
(PBC).15 This is a discontinuity in the sense that it is an up-or-down declaration. The idea is to warn
shareholders, or perhaps to gain public and political approval, by announcing that while it is a forprofit entity, the corporation will, or is free to, operate in a manner that balances shareholders’
pecuniary interests with public benefits, including the well-being of employees, the environment,
and other public or stakeholder interests. Again, investors might benefit if there were some
requirement that the corporation announced periodically how much profit was sacrificed in these
interests, but there is no such requirement, though presumably a daring corporation could provide
such information on its own – and risk being sued by conventional shareholders who discovered
some false information. I know of no corporation that provides this information, perhaps for the
reason emphasized here; to specify is to open one up to future lawsuits. To be sure, there may be
other reasons to be vague; a more informative disclosure might reveal a trade secret, for example,
and thus be privately destructive and possibly socially inefficient.
A second kind of revelation is also discontinuous, but more reliable. As in the case of
kosher products, outsourcing is available. B Lab is a nonprofit organization that administers “B
Corp” certification. B Lab asks for a variety of information from applicants and then either certifies
or not (based on company size and environmental impact, corporate charter provisions, and many

15
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other characteristics) without providing a score.16 It would not be surprising to find an evolution to
more useful and continuous information.
I do not mean to suggest that vague disclosures are more likely to be discontinuous (as in
the case of B Corps) or continuous. For example, while “This food product may contain tree nuts”
is relatively continuous in the sense that the consumer is not given precise information about the
probability that the product contains more than 2 grams of nuts, it is of course discontinuous in that
the law commonly requires disclosure about nuts, meat products, and several other matters, and is
not satisfied with a disclosure like “This product may contain small or large amounts of substances
to which some consumers might be allergic, religiously, or morally opposed to ingesting.” An upor-down categorization might be described a continuous or as discontinuous, but once again the
question is whether it is more or less so than obvious alternatives. The point is that the regulated
party could choose to satisfy relatively discontinuous laws with less information rather than more,
and could also choose to comply with a relatively continuous requirement by offering less useful
information than that to which it has ready access. It is plain that the government does not require
the fullest available information because this sort of requirement is hard to enforce. Private entities
do not do so because specificity invites ex post criticism and liability.
B. Accounting Rules and Guidelines
Returning to the corporate context, another kind of demarcation or safety net is provided by
accounting rules, and their acceptance in courts. Accounting rules often provide less information
than is actually available.17 An accountant might say that corporate disclosures were verified in
compliance with generally accepted accounting standards, but this is presumably inferior to the
accountant’s disclosure that “We investigated the corporation’s report of income and based on
statistical sampling, we think it is 30% likely that the disclosure is accurate, 50% likely that income
is somewhat greater than reported, but has been under-reported perhaps to avoid future lawsuits,
and 20% likely to have been overstated (10% by an amount greater than $1 million).” If the
corporation is later accused of misrepresentation – perhaps a seller of stock complains about understatements, or a buyer of stock sues because of over-statements – it will normally be safe if it
adhered to “generally accepted accounting principles.”18 The corporation needs to fear an
accusation of intentional misrepresentation or a claim that it withheld information from its
16
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accountants. The law’s reliance on accounting conventions is striking. In some cases, like the
reporting of interest expenses, the accounting information is precise and readily compared to that
produced by other companies and their accountants. But other information is vaguely specific. It is
not surprising that a party considering the purchase of a company will investigate assets and past
performance, and will rarely rely on accountants’ previous reports. Better information is plainly
available to the prospective acquirer, but law seems satisfied or more comfortable with the
(unnatural but available) demarcations provided by accounting conventions.
Guidelines and “best practices,” whether produced by law, industry groups, or observed
practices, offer a final example of demarcations that are significant whether described as
continuous, discontinuous, or some combination of the two, depending on the observer’s
perspective. A guideline is commonly thought of as a recommended practice that allows some
discretion or leeway in its interpretation, implementation, or use. There is no announced penalty
for ignoring a government-issued guideline, but to ignore it is to leave one open to a claim, when
adherence to the guideline would have prevented a loss to a litigant. Correspondingly, following a
guideline can be a useful defense. Guidelines are commonly issued in some countries (like Japan),
while their cousin, best-practices, are more common in others (like the United States). Best
practices tend to emanate from private parties, or are simply discerned from industry behavior or
meetings, while guidelines normally refer to declarations by agencies or other governmental
entities.19 In theory, a guideline might serve as a testing ground for future lawmaking; a guideline
or best practice might also be a means by which established companies try to raise the cost of entry
to rivals. I am unaware of evidence that either of these is the case.
To be sure, guidelines or comparable pronouncements are not exactly examples of legal
discontinuities, if only because they can be exceeded, but courts will regularly rely on them when
evaluating a party’s behavior. It is often a good defense to show that one abided by announced
guidelines, and it is certainly a problem when a defendant failed to abide by a guideline. The same
is true for announced best practices. It goes without saying that these demarcations provide less
information than is available. It would be useful in many tort cases, for example, to know how often
a defendant’s employees were tested for drug use, and then to hear a cost-benefit analysis about
more frequent testing, than it is learn that the defendant tested its employees in accord with non-

The generally accepted accounting principles mentioned above are one example of “best practices”
emanating from industry behavior and promulgated by non-governmental entities, specifically the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB). See FASB ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION, FASB (Mar. 4,
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binding guidelines announced by an agency. And yet, courts are more interested in the latter than
the former. Absent strict liability, corporations have little to gain from engaging in such cost-benefit
calculations in order to adjust their own testing procedures. It is safer and often less expensive to
comply with best practices or available guidelines. Again, guidelines and best practices, and even
accounting norms, can be lawfully ignored, but the idea here is that these are devices that provide
less than optimal information.
Section IV.C. now turns to the question of how current law and practices might be
improved. It must be apparent that all involved parties would be better off if accountants could
certify, and even be encouraged to certify, that the information disclosed and examined, perhaps in
probabilistic form, was at least as useful as what could have been disclosed by following generally
accepted guidelines. The discussion that follows then generalizes this claim.
C. Improving Disclosures with Safe Harbors
We have seen that a description of current disclosure rules as “vaguely specific” is often
appropriate. But if useful information is a goal of disclosure rules, then things can be improved.
Existing disclosure rules are often the product of lawmakers’ drive toward enforceable and
politically expedient rules, however useless they may be. These disclosure rules are also attractive
to regulated parties, who will favor something containing a mixture of specificity and openendedness in order to make compliance easy, and to reduce the threat of liability. Disclosure
requirements in corporate law and elsewhere, even if actually read by the intended beneficiaries, 20
provide so much less information than they might – even though the more useful information is
already possessed by the regulated party. Indeed, it is plausible that one reason so few parties avail
themselves of the required disclosures is that their experience is that the effort expended in reading
the information provides very little in the form of useful information, for the very reasons discussed
here.
But what if law promised that so long as the information disclosed was as informative as
that found in minimally compliant documents or announcements, then disclosing parties would find
themselves in a safe harbor, protected from future litigation and discoveries that some pieces of
information were inaccurate? The market might then encourage the provision of useful information.
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I would prefer that my doctor tell me that an operation has a .04% chance of killing me and a 1%
chance of requiring a blood transfusion, rather than being told “This procedure can lead to death or
a need for a blood transfusion.” Indeed, I might like to see a curve representing the likelihood of
various outcomes. There is, to be sure, the danger that the information provided will be inaccurate,
through negligence or other processes, but the idea is for the disclosure to be protected so long as
it provides more information than that offered by the familiar vaguely specific form. In the
corporate context, a corporation would be within this safe harbor if it gave probabilistic information
about projected sales and costs so long as this information, even if it contained some errors, was
superior to “We do not expect lawsuits against us to significantly affect our future, and the numbers
offered here are reported according to accepted accounting standards.”
There are, of course, some problems with this proposed rule. How are judges (or even firms
seeking to comply with the law) to determine the utility of minimally compliant rules? Even if we
assume that probabilistic values attached to a spectrum, as favored here, should be compared to the
little information provided by guidelines or by accepted accounting standards, it will often be
difficult to evaluate the usefulness of those guidelines or accepted practices. A rule that offers a
safe harbor for X only if X is superior to Y is of little use if Y is of unknown value to interested
parties, including judges. A corporation that provides a set of probabilities about future earnings
will find it easy to show that this information is more useful than the compliant “our rate of return
will likely be greater than 6%.” But one that attaches probabilities to the impact of climate change
might face endless litigation when investors find some mistakes in the data, and argue that what
was disclosed was not more informative than “climate change is likely to have a significant impact
on our investments in real estate in Florida.” It is simply difficult to assess the utility of the vague,
non-probabilistic disclosure, and therefore hard to say whether the probabilistic disclosure was
more informative. Moreover, the vague but compliant disclosure may be of different value to a
seasoned investor than to an unsophisticated individual. Fortunately, this problem is not
insurmountable. Consider the example of corporate disclosures. If the safe harbor idea, as suggested
here, were put into law, it is likely that third parties, such as accounting firms, would be asked to
certify that the probabilistic information provided by a firm was in its professional opinion more
informative than previously accepted disclosures. Note that if accounting firms are deployed to
certify that a probabilistic disclosure is superior to what was previously encouraged by law, the
industry will have less of an incentive to lobby against the proposed change, or experiment. There
is also an alternative solution to the problem of comparing probabilistic data with the familiar
vaguely specific data, and it also offers a role for accounting firms. Corporations might choose to
disclose information in two forms: conventional and probabilistic declarations. Experts, or

accounting firms, would then be asked to certify that the probabilistic, more continuous,
descriptions added to the picture and were not misleading.
There is also the possibility that insurance companies could be usefully incorporated into
the safe harbor proposal. Firms could purchase insurance as protection against the risk that their
disclosures will not satisfy the safe harbor requirements. Insurers (perhaps more successfully than
accounting firms) will then have an incentive to study the firm and its disclosures in order to assess
the risk of future litigation.
Finally, there is a familiar argument against the safe harbor idea: why has the market not
brought this into being on its own? Put differently, and in terms of Section II.A., why has there not
been an evolutionary move from discontinuity to a kind of continuity? The answer offered here is
that law has been an obstacle. Potential defendants fear providing better information because to do
so would increase the likelihood that there will be at least one piece of false information or error. It
is safer, then, to go along with the game of useless specificity. Changes in law might be needed to
encourage experimentation with more useful information.

CONCLUSION
In an era where more information is available at lower cost, and statistical techniques are
sophisticated, investors and consumers should be given more useful information. They will receive
this information if the provider is protected by a rule that recognizes that although more information
is likely to contain more errors, it is still more useful than the vaguely specific statements that
currently comply with law. Corporate (and securities) law is a good place to start experimenting
with this idea for more useful disclosures.

